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The decision in United Bank is in consonance with the plain
language of the Code and in accord with prior case law.22 3 It is

submitted that in factual settings involving the fraudulent shipment of totally worthless merchandise, such as United Bank, the
defrauded buyer should be afforded the protection of section 5-114
by having the onus of proving holder in due course status placed
upon the party seeking payment. If this burden is not met, the
party victimized by fraud in the transaction will be protected. On
the other hand, should the holder carry the burden, his claim will
be sustained in the face of an accusation of fraud. This is in keeping
with the Code's underlying philosophy that as between two innocent
parties, the one farthest from the fraud should be protected. 241 As a

result of the United Bank decision, a practitioner pursuing an action
in which he is seeking to claim holder in due course status in connection with article 5 of the Code must be prepared to carry the burden
of proving such status.
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK PRACTICE

Evidence of habitual carelessness held admissible to establish
plaintiff's negligence in products liability action.
New York courts uniformly have excluded evidence of habitual
carelessness in negligence actions, deeming proof of such behavior
nity to cross-examine. 41 N.Y.2d at 264, 360 N.E.2d at 951, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 273. The Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that where the party serving the interrogatories does not have
the opportunity to cross-examine or impeach the party offering the answers, the exception
contained in CPLR 3117(a)(3)(ii) is not satisfied and the answers are inadmissible. Noting
that the exception to CPLR 3117 requires that "the absence of a witness must not have been
procured by the party seeking to offer a deposition or responses to interrogatories," the Court
also found the answers inadmissible because the plaintiff banks had refused to produce a
prospective witness and objected to a deposition. 41 N.Y.2d at 265, 360 N.E.2d at 952, 392
N.Y.S.2d at 274 (citing CPLR § 3117(a)(3)(ii)). In the Court's opinion, this was tantamount
to procuring the absence of a witness from the jurisdiction. 41 N.Y.2d at 265, 360 N.E.2d at
952, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
223 See Banco Espanol de Credito v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 409 F.2d 711 (1st
Cir. 1969); Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1941). In Banco Espanol the buyer and seller failed to agree upon the precise
shipping documents required to collect on the letter of credit. Judge Coffin, in applying the
Massachusetts Code, had no doubt that once a defense of improper documentation was
established, § 5-114(2) and article 3 placed the burden of proof upon the party seeking to
claim holder in due course protection.
"I The United Bank Court noted that while contrary authority exists, the better view is
that as between two innocent parties, the party who chooses to deal with fraudfeasors should
bear the ultimate loss. Thus, fraud on the part of the seller may not be used by a buyer to
defeat the rights of a holder in due course. 41 N.Y.2d at 261 n.6, 360 N.E.2d at 949 n.6, 392
N.Y.S.2d at 271 n.6. See generally N.Y.U.C.C. § 5-114, commentary at 686-89 (McKinney
1964).
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nonprobative of a person's conduct on a particular occasion.2 21 Recently, however, the Court of Appeals in Halloranv. Virginia Chemicals, Inc., 22 reexamined the rationale behind this exclusion and
concluded that under circumstances in which habitual carelessness
is both deliberate and repetitive, it possesses sufficient probative
22
value to warrant admissibility.
Halloranwas a products liability action instituted by an automobile mechanic to recover for injuries caused by the explosion of
a pressurized can of refrigerant which he had been using to charge
an automobile air-conditioning unit. 221 Plaintiff Halloran admitted
on direct examination that he had placed the allegedly defective can
in a pail of warm tap water to cause the gas to flow more freely, but
further testified that he always read and complied with the temperature warnings printed on such cans. On the day of the explosion,
according to his testimony, Halloran had checked the temperature
of the water with a thermometer to insure that it was well below the
prescribed 130 degree safety level.22 1 In an attempt to establish contributory negligence, defendant, the packager of the freon refrigerant, sought to prove that it was plaintiff's practice to employ an
electrically heated immersion coil to heat the water and thus accelerate the flow of the highly compressed gas. This practice clearly
212See, e.g., Zucker v. Whitridge, 205 N.Y. 50, 98 N.E. 209 (1912); Grenadier v. Surface
Transp., 271 App. Div. 460, 66 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1st Dep't 1946). The admission of habit evidence to establish negligence may constitute reversible error in New York. See, e.g., Morgan
v. Robinson, 3 App. Div. 2d 216, 217-28, 159 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640-41 (1st Dep't 1957). See
generally W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 186 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973).
Other jurisdictions are divided regarding the admissibility of habit evidence in negligence cases. See, e.g., Strauss v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 404 F.2d 1152, 1158 (2d Cir. 1968)
(systematic conduct admissible); Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. Hare, 297 Ky. 5, 10, 178
S.W.2d 835, 838 (1944) (evidence of prior habits of care by deceased at railroad crossing held
immaterial); Fissette v. Boston & Me. R.R., 98 N.H. 136, 142-43, 96 A.2d 303, 307 (1953)
(decedent's habit of looking both ways at railroad crossing admissible); Glatt v. Feist, 156
N.W.2d 819, 828 (N.D. 1968) (proper to show decedent's habit of crossing outside the crosswalk); Fenton v. Aleshire, 238 Ore. 24, 37, 393 P.2d 217, 223 (1964) (evidence of deceased's
habits held inadmissible where contradicted by eyewitness).
It should be noted that New York Courts admit habit evidence in actions not involving
negligence. Therefore, evidence concerning an attorney's habit of properly following the execution procedure prescribed for wills has been admitted, see In re Will of Kellum, 52 N.Y.
517, 519-20 (1873), and evidence of a district attorney's regular practice of advising defendants of their rights at arraignment also has been admitted, see People v. Bombard, 5 App.
Div. 2d 923, 172 N.Y.S.2d 1 (3d Dep't) (mem.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 849 (1958).
-8 41 N.Y.2d 386, 361 N.E.2d 991, 393 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1977), rev'g 50 App. Div. 2d 852,
377 N.Y.S.2d 132 (2d Dep't 1975) (mem.).
21 41 N.Y.2d at 389, 361 N.E.2d at 994, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
= Id.
Id. at 390, 361 N.E.2d at 994, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
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contravened warnings printed on the can.23 Plaintiff denied ever
having used an immersion coil, and defendant thereafter attempted
to impeach plaintiff's credibility by offering a witness who allegedly
had seen plaintiff use such a coil on prior occasions and had warned
him of the dangers involved."' Halloran objected to the admission
of this testimony, claiming that extrinsic evidence could not be
introduced to impeach his testimony on a collateral matter such as
habitual conduct.2 32 The trial court sustained plaintiff's objection
233
and the appellate division affirmed.
In reversing the judgment of the appellate division, the Court
of Appeals held that if it were plaintiff's practice to use an immersion coil during the routine charging of air-conditioning systems,
evidence of that fact would be "logically probative" of the cause of
the accident and not "collateral. '234 On remittal, if defendant could
show such a practice, the habit evidence would be admissible to
impeach plaintiff's testimony and as evidence in chief on defendant's direct case. 235 Chief Judge Breitel, writing for a unanimous
panel, examined the rationale underlying previous decisions which
230

Id.

231Id.

232Id. at 390, 361 N.E.2d at 994, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 344-45. The fact that habit evidence
presents a multiplicity of collateral issues not raised by the pleadings was one of the factors
which led to its inadmissibility in New York negligence cases. See Zucker v. Whitridge, 205
N.Y. 50, 61, 98 N.E. 209, 212 (1912), (quoting Parsons v. Syracuse, B. & N.Y.R.R., 133 App.
Div. 461, 462, 117 N.Y.S. 1058, 1059 (3d Dep't 1909)). In general, a fact is not considered
collateral if it is relevant to an issue in the case. People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 245,
247 N.E.2d 642, 644, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, 821, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969). If a fact is
deemed collateral, a witness's testimony with respect to that fact may not be impeached
through the use of extrinsic evidence unless the evidence offered is relevant to some other
issue in the case or is independently admissible for impeachment purposes. See Potter v.
Browne, 197 N.Y. 288, 90 N.E. 812 (1910);-W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 491 (10th ed. J. Prince
1973).
2 50 App. Div. 2d at 852, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 132. A majority of the appellate division found
the proffered habit evidence nonprobative of the plaintiff's conduct on the day of the accident
and stated that its admission would give rise to collateral issues which could result in a trial
within a trial. Id. at 852, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 134. The two dissenting justices stressed that since
Halloran's testimony was uncorroborated, the defendant's evidence should be admissible to
impeach Halloran's credibility "upon a material and most significant fact." Id. at 853, 377
N.Y.S.2d at 135 (Christ, J., dissenting).
23'41 N.Y.2d at 390, 361 N.E.2d at 995, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
23 Id. at 392, 361 N.E.2d at 995, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 346. The Court also noted that evidence
concerning plaintiff's practice of recharging air-conditioners, even if considered a collateral
matter, was made admissible and material by Halloran's own testimony on direct examination. The Court reasoned that since plaintiff had "opened the door" by testifying in respect
to this issue, he could not be permitted to benefit from his own testimony while thwarting
the introduction of rebuttal evidence by the defendant. 41 N.Y.2d at 393, 361 N.E.2d at 99697, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 346-47. See also W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 490 (10th ed.J. Prince 1973).
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had precluded the use of evidence concerning "prior instances of
carelessness to create an inference of carelessness on a particular
occasion. ' 2 31 Such a broad exclusionary doctrine, the Court reasoned, was fallacious in that it assumed an individual's habits never
could be logically probative of conduct in a specific instance." 7 The
Court found the rule particularly unwarranted in the instant case
where the task performed by the plaintiff was essentially mechanical in nature, and the evidence at issue concerned proof of a "deliberate and repetitive practice." 53 In reforming the broad inadmissibility doctrine previously adhered to in New York, however, Chief
Judge Breitel carefully limited the Court's holding to those cases
wherein the evidence offered satisfies two important criteria: it
must reflect a "deliberate repetitive practice, ' 239 and demonstrate
the existence of a habit not subject to deviations based on surrounding circumstances.240
It is submitted that the Halloran Court, in emphasizing the
requirements of deliberate and repetitive action, correctly focused
upon the frequency of an actor's conduct and his control of the
circumstances. Application of the Court's limited holding, however,
may not be a simple task given the obvious difficulties involved in
recognizing those habits characterized by the requisite degree of
deliberateness.2 41 Nevertheless, the decision in Halloran appears to

"141 N.Y.2d at 388-89, 361 N.E.2d at 993, 393 N.Y.S.2d

at 343-44.
117
Id. at 389, 361 N.E.2d at 994, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 344. The problems encountered in
admitting habit evidence are summarized succinctly in some questions posed by Professor
Wigmore:
Is it possible to believe that careless action can ever be anything more than casual
or occasional? If it is, are we not really predicating a careless disposition, rather
than a genuine habit, and . . . violating the rule against character [evidence] in
civil cases . ..?
1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 97 (3d ed. 1940). Professor Wigmore concluded, however, that these
doubts are not well founded since habit evidence is more probative and less cumbersome to
employ at trial than character evidence. Id. Professor McCormick similarly observed that
"unquestionably the uniformity of one's response to habit is greater than the consistency with
which one's conduct conforms to character or disposition." C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 195 at 463 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
41 N.Y.2d at 392, 361 N.E.2d at 995-96, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
211Id. at 392, 361 N.E.2d at 995-96, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
2,0Id.

"IA few observations concerning the admissibility of habit evidence under the Halloran
rule are possible. Thus, evidence of an individual's habit of jumping on moving trains, see
Eppendorf v. Brooklyn City & N.R.R., 69 N.Y. 195 (1877) (per curiam), or looking both ways
before crossing an intersection, see Zucker v. Whitridge, 205 N.Y. 50, 98 N.E. 209 (1912), is
likely to remain inadmissible since such habits are not sufficiently deliberate and the actor
in those situations lacks the requisite control of the circumstances. 41 N.Y.2d at 392, 361
N.E.2d at 996, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 346. In addition, Dean McLaughlin has submitted that a
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be well reasoned and in agreement with the apparent trend in New
York toward flexible application of the rules of evidence to meet the
very practical problems encountered by both parties in a products
liability suit. 4 ' As long as the habitual conduct evidence admitted
involves a repeated particularized reaction by a person in control of
a situation, it would seem that the considerations underlying the
exclusion of general habit evidence will not be violated by continued
application of the Halloranrule.
Evidence of subsequent repairsheld admissible in products liability
action.
New York courts consistently have ruled that proof of postoccurrence repairs is inadmissible to establish a defendant's negligence."' The admission of such evidence is deemed contrary to public policy on the ground that it tends to discourage reparative measures.' Recently, however, in Barry v. Manglass, 2 5 the Appellate
Division, Second Department, held that these policy considerations
do not require that evidence of postaccident repairs be excluded in
products liability actions.2 4
person's habit of smoking in bed probably is not sufficiently deliberate to be admissible.
McLaughlin, Evidence, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 11, 1977, at 2, col. 2.
2"2 The evidentiary problems encountered in products liability suits seem to encourage
liberalization of the rules of evidence in such litigation. See, e.g., Barry v. Manglass, 55 App.
Div. 2d 1, 10, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 877 (2d Dep't 1976) (auto recall letters held admissible in a
products liability action); Vincent v. Thompson, 50 App. Div. 2d 211, 223-25, 377 N.Y.S.2d
118, 130-31 (2d Dep't 1975) (dicta) (the continued viability of the hearsay rule in products
liability cases questioned).
213See, e.g., Getty v. Town of Hamlin, 127 N.Y. 636, 638, 27 N.E. 399, 399-400 (1891)
(evidence of postaccident repair inadmissible to prove a defendant's negligence); Causa v.
Kenny, 156 App. Div. 134, 137-38, 141 N.Y.S. 98, 100 (lst Dep't 1913) (repairs in structure
not admissible to establish negligence). See also W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 168 (10th ed. J.
Prince 1973).
Although subsequent repair evidence is not admissible to establish negligence, it may
be used for other relevant purposes such as establishing who controlled a particular instrumentality. See id.
2' See Causa v. Kenny, 156 App. Div. 134, 141 N.Y.S. 98 (1st Dep't 1913); McCoRMICK,
EVIDENCE § 275 at 666 (2d ed. 1972). Postoccurrence repair evidence has also been condemned
as prejudicial. For example, in Fraumberg v. Schmohl, 190 N.Y.S. 710 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st
Dep't 1921), plaintiff suffered injuries when she fell on a stairway in a house owned by a
defendant. The trial court permitted testimony which established that subsequent to the
accident, the owner of the building caused repairs to be made. In overturning this ruling, the
appellate court stated: "[Sluch evidence has universally and most frequently been condemned as inadmissible and highly prejudicial." Id. at 711. (emphasis added).
"1 55 App. Div. 2d 1, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870 (2d Dep't 1976).
216Strict products liability was recognized as a viable cause of action in New York in
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973). There, the Court
of Appeals held that "under a doctrine of strict products liability, the manufacturer of a

